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INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE SPONSORSHIP
OF COMMON TECHNOLOGICAL STANDARDS: THE CASE OF
SUN MICROSYSTEMS AND JAVA
RAGHU GARUD
New York University
SANJAY JAIN
University of Wisconsin—Madison
ARUN KUMARASWAMY
Rutgers University, Camden
The institutional entrepreneurship implicit in a firm's sponsorship of its technology as
a common standard is heset hy several challenges. These challenges arise from a
standard's property to enahle and constrain even as potential competitors agree to
cooperate on its creation. Our exploration of Sun Microsystems's sponsorship of its
Java technology suggests that standards in the making generate seeds of self-destruction. Our study also identifies the social and political skills that a sponsor deploys to
address these challenges.

Institutional theorists draw attention to tbe
taken-for-granted facets of social and economic life
(cf. Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). Tbese
taken-for-granted facets represent institutionalized
rules tbat manifest tbemselves in tbe ways tbat
people frame issues, make cboices, and pursue bebaviors (Jepperson, 1991). Indeed, conformity to
institutionalized rules may generate patb dependence leading to specific ways of tbinking and doing (Artbur, 1989; David, 1985; Nortb, 1990).
Altbougb considerable work exists on organizational compliance to preexisting institutions, relatively little work explores bow tbese institutions
arise in tbe first place (Fligstein, 1997). As DiMaggio observed: "Institutional tbeory tells us relatively little about 'institutionalization' as an unfinisbed process (as opposed to an acbieved state)"
(1988: 12). An appreciation of bow institutions
arise can add to understanding of bow and wby
people operate in today's environment relying on
institutions bammered out in tbe past. It can also
add to understanding of bow institutions can be

created for tbe future as new tecbnological, geograpbical, and cultural imperatives emerge.
Of specific interest to us is tbe role of actors in
sbaping emerging institutions (Cbristensen, Karn0e,
Pedersen, & Dobbin 1997; Scott & Cbristensen,
1995). In tbis regard, Fligstein (1999) offered two
ways of bringing actors back into a tbeory of institution creation. One is to borrow from economic
tbeories, sucb as game tbeory and otber models of
rational action. Sucb a view discounts tbe messy,
political processes involved and can easily lead to
a post boc, rationalized view of bow institutions
emerge. A second way is to employ tbe tenets of
institutional tbeory in organizational analysis and
explore bow actors build tbeir goals and procedures directly into emerging institutions (Hirscb,
1975; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). We pursued tbis perspective in tbis study focusing on tbe "skilled performances" of social actors tbat lie at tbe core of tbe
production and reproduction of social life (Giddens, 1979).
Initiatives to sbape institutions as tbey emerge
represent acts of institutional entrepreneursbip
(DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Selznick, 1957).
Institutional entrepreneurs create a wbole new system of meaning tbat ties tbe functioning of disparate sets of institutions togetber (DiMaggio, 1988).
Tbey define, legitimize, combat, or co-opt rivals to
succeed in tbeir institutional projects (Scott, 1994).
Assuming tbe role of cbampions, tbey energize efforts toward collective action and devise strategies
for establisbing stable sequences of interaction
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with Other organizations to create entirely new industries and associated institutions (Aldrich & Fiol,
1994),
These acts of institutional entrepreneurship are
becoming increasingly important as new technologies break open taken-for-granted assumptions that
constitute the institutional "black box." No technology exists in a vacuum. Each requires a defined
institutional space with rules that govern the production, distribution, and consumption of associated artifacts (Dosi, 1982; Rosenberg, 1982; Van de
Ven & Carud, 1994). Indeed, technological fields
are embedded in the institutional environments
that shape them (Dacin, Ventresca, & Beale, 1999;
Garud & Jain, 1996).
Technological standards are key facets of this
institutional space (Jain, 2001), They represent interface specifications or "rules of engagement" that
dictate how different components of technological
systems work together to provide utility to users
(Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993), Often, common
technological standards have to emerge before users can evaluate and exchange products in the marketplace (Garud & Rappa, 1994), In other words,
common standards offer a framework within which
product-markets operate (Garud & Karn0e, 2002;
Porac, Rosa, Spanjol, & Saxon, 2001).
By shaping common standards, firms can build
attributes of their technologies directly into emerging institutional structures (Constant, 1980). This is
consistent with a Lamarckian conceptualization of
human agency in which agents directly shape the
selection mechanisms that then govern their functioning (Gould, 1980). Firms can derive significant
competitive benefits by successfully shaping common standards (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). This
proposition is particularly true of information technology fields characterized by network externalities and increasing returns (Arthur, 1989; Farrell &
Saloner, 1986; Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Shapiro &
Varian, 1999), In such network technological fields,
mutualistically interdependent firms produce individual components of larger technological systems
(Barnett, 1990; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1995a;
Langlois & Robertson, 1992),
We explore the challenges that an individual
firm faces in sponsoring its own technology as a
common standard within network technological
fields. To address this facet of institutional entrepreneurship, we carried out a deep exploration of
Sun Microsystems' efforts to sponsor its Java software technology. Introduced by Sun in 1995, Java
enables computers and information appliances to
run applications distributed over a network. Barely
seven years old, Java has emerged as a common
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standard, although its ownership has been contested and its eventual success was not assured.
Sun's role in sponsoring Java is illuminating. The
firm has attempted to set and shape a standard
before product-markets have emerged fully. Sun
has done this by offering others access to its proprietary technology, thereby starting a bandwagon
effect around Java. However, Sun has also controlled access to the technology on occasions when
it thought that Java had become "too hot." Indeed,
Sun's sponsorship of Java is a story full of contradictions reflecting the wider dilemmas surrounding sponsorship of technology through institutional
processes.
To explore these contradictions and dilemmas,
we begin the article with an overview of technological fields and the role that standards play in their
governance. Then, we discuss tensions that are inherent in the creation and maintenance of common
standards and the challenges that a firm confronts
in sponsoring common standards over time. Subsequent to our exploration of how Sun has been confronting these challenges in the case of Java, we
offer insights on institutional entrepreneurship
within emerging network technological fields.
TECHNOLOGICAL FIELDS AND STANDARDS

Technological fields represent a pattern of relationships among objects and humans related to a
product-market domain (Callón, 1986; Garud &
Karnae, 2002). This conceptualization is similar to
the notion of organizational fields comprising a
shared set of meanings (Scott, 1995: 130). Within
technological fields, meanings of artifacts and patterns of interaction among actors emerge through a
negotiated process (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987).
Of specific interest to us is the institutional environment that governs the patterns of interaction
within technological fields. This institutional environment includes public policy regimes (Dobbin &
Dowd, 1997), regulatory instruments (Van de Ven &
Garud, 1989), and mechanisms for venture capital
financing (Kenney, 2000; Suchman, 1994), It also
includes different sources of legitimacy (Aldrich &
Fiol, 1994; Rao, 1994) and underlying norms of
community interaction (Karn0e, 1999).
A rich stream of research on the social construction of technology explores processes underlying
the emergence of institutions. For instance, new
technological ñelds have to establish legitimacy to
generate momentum (Hughes, 1983). These legitimacy battles are manifest not only in clashes between old and new technological fields, but also in
clashes between alternative technological trajectories within a field, as each vies to become the
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"dominant design" (Garud & Karn0e, 2002; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback & Abernathy,
1975). Indeed, new evaluation criteria have to
emerge and be recognized for a new field to establish its legitimacy (Constant, 1980). Competition
among technologies occurs both between and
within evaluation criteria (Carud & Rappa, 1994).
Eventually, institutional closure brings about stability around a set of specific evaluation criteria
(Van den Belt & Rip, 1987). Once this happens,
these institutional facets represent "traces of order
in man-made complexities" (Hughes, 1983: ix) that
imbue a technological field with a "distinctive
style" that reflects the creative latitude of the actors
who contributed to its creation (Hughes, 1983).
At the heart of these technological fields lie technological systems. Technological systems comprise
a set of components that interact with one another
to provide utility to users. A system's performance
is dependent not only on the performance of constituent components but also on the extent to
which they are compatible with one another (Carud
& Kumaraswamy, 1993; Henderson & Clark, 1990;
Jain, 2001; Sanchez, 1995; Schilling, 2000). Compatibility among system components is achieved by
designing them to common standards. Standards
are codified specifications that detail the form and
function of individual components and the rules of
engagement among them. Together, specifications
about the components' form and function and tbe
rules determining their interaction define a system's "architecture" (Ferguson & Morris, 1993).
The presence or absence of common standards
impacts innovation within a technological field.
Rigid adherence to common standards may dampen
innovation. This is because interdependent firms
find it difficult to innovate outside the common
standard for fear of introducing incompatibilities.
On the other hand, absent common standards,
firms that develop disparate components of a technological system are unable to coordinate their activities easily (cf. Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000),
Consequently, components manufactured by different firms may not interact or perform well with one
another.
These observations arise from a paradoxical
property of common standards—they enable and
constrain at the same time (Carud & Jain, 1996; Jain,
2001). This "structurational" property of standards
is representative of a broader proposition that
structure is both medium and outcome of action
(Giddens, 1984). In other words, structures generated to enable action also begin to constrain it. A
standard too can be viewed as both medium and
outcome of firms' actions. They enable by providing producers and users an opportunity to develop
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or use different parts of a technological system in a
distributed manner. At the same time, they constrain its evolution to certain directions.'
This structurational property of standards creates
a problem in mobilizing a coalition around a new
standard. We know that free-riding behavior dampens collective action (cf. Olson, 1965). The enabling
and constraining property of standards suggests additional challenges in mobilizing a coalition. First,
new technologies have to overcome inertia to supplant standards enabling the functioning of existing
technological fields. Second, firms may realize that
agreement on a standard may constrain their activities in the future.
The problem of generating collective action
around a new standard becomes even more pronounced when the emerging coalition comprises
firms, which have private interests. This problem
arises from the presence of simultaneous cooperation and competition, which usually lie in contrast
with one another. Yet, in generating collective action to create common standards, cooperation has
to be induced among a group of firms, some of
which may be rivals.
This "coopetitional" (Brandenburger & Nalebuff,
1995) property of standards ensures that cooperation among members of a standards collective is
uneasy at best. Inducing and maintaining such a
collective is a challenge even for a neutral body. It
is even more of a challenge for a firm that, in its
own private interest, wants to sponsor its technology as a common standard. This is because a sponsoring firm has to convince potential competitors to
support a common standard that could offer the
sponsor a competitive advantage in the future.
Complicating the situation is the active resistance
that a sponsor is likely to confront from incumbents
in established technological fields whose dominance is threatened by the sponsor's initiatives.
Our purpose in offering these observations is to
draw attention to the tensions that structurational
and coopetitional properties create during the standardization process (see Figure 1). These tensions,
in turn, create challenges for a firm attempting to
sponsor its technology as a common standard. We
examined Sun's efforts to sponsor its Java technology to gain a finer appreciation of what it means to

^ Just as organizational fields may be "overembedded"
or "underembedded" in a system of social relations
(Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996), so too can technological
fields be associated with different levels of embeddedness based on tbe extent to which a standard enables or
constrains (Garud & Jain, 1996).
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FIGURE 1
Standards in the Making: Sponsorship Challenges
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be an institutional entrepreneur in an emerging
technological field.
RESEARCH SITE AND METHODS
We chose to study Sun's sponsorship of its Java
technology as a common standard for several reasons. First, Java is a software technology that exemplifies the distributed computing paradigm characteristic of network technological fields. Second,
Sun had had prior experience and success in technology sponsorship, most notably in the workstation market (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993). Third,
data on Sun's role in sponsoring Java are readily
available. All these factors make the Java technological field a strategic research site (Bijker et al.,
1987).
What makes this research site particularly interesting is that Sun struggled in its sponsorship efforts despite its considerable experience in sponsoring common standards and its possession of
what most analysts consider a revolutionary technology in Java. Indeed, at various stages of Java's
evolution. Sun's success was far from assured. Consequently, our study of this emerging technological
field was consistent with the position that it is
important to view success and failure symmetrically (Bijker et al., 1987). Studying an emerging
technological field also compelled us to conceptualize institutional entrepreneurship in process

rather than in variance terms (Mohr, 1982), leading
to insights that recognize the precariousness of
such endeavors.
Our objective was to offer observations on the
challenges of technology sponsorship based on systematic data analysis. Technology sponsorship efforts are complex initiatives embedded within coevolutionary dynamics (Rosenkopf & Tushman,
1994; Van de Ven & Garud, 1994). This complexity
renders the study of technology sponsorship amenable to naturalistic inquiry in which insights are
induced through interpretive means (Lincoln &
Guba, 1985). Specifically, the unfolding of these
processes is better explicated by tracing their historical roots using inductive logic.
The aim of naturalistic inquiry is to generalize
from a case to a theory rather than from a sample to
a population. Typically, this is accomplished by
"iterating" between data and theoretical constructs
until a stage of theoretical saturation is reached
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Moreover, this inquiry
mode emphasizes "procedural adequacy" and
"credibility" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), which we
established by employing steps that Miles and Huberman (1984) suggested in their primer on qualitative research.
We tracked publicly available information from
several on-line technology news services, including CNET News, New York Times Online, San Jose
Mercury News Online, TechWeb, the Wall Street
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TABLE 1
Java Standardization: Chronotogy
Major Events

Year
1995

Sun announces Java commercially on May 23, 1995.
Sun allows developers to download Java from its Web site for free.
By year-end, Sun has licensed Java to 38 vendors, including IBM, Oracle, Intel, and AT&T.
Microsoft licenses Java from Sun in December.

1996

Sun announces JavaSoft, a subsidiary to administer Java-related activities.
Sun announces initiatives to develop new technologies to increase Java's functionality.
Kleiner Perkins Caufield Byers creates a $100 million venture fund to finance Java start-ups.
Sun releases a more robust version of Java, JDK 1.1.
Sun introduces stringent Java compatibility tests and the 100% Pure Java initiative.
By year-end. Sun's list of Java licensees has grown to over 100 vendors.

1997

Sun announces delivery of new Java technologies by the end of 1997.
Sun applies to the International Organization for Standards {ISO} to get Java accepted as a global standard.
Sun sues Microsoft for infringing its Java licensing agreement.
By year-end, the number of Java licensees has increased to over 150.

1998

Sun licenses Java to TCI and Motorola for use in mass-market consumer products.
Hewlett Packard announces plans to market its own embedded Java clone.
Sun announces broad joint Java development pact with IBM.
Sun announces reorganization of its Java subsidiary to separate its Java applications development effort from its Java
standardization effort. Sun also announces that PriceWaterhouseCooper will monitor the standardization process.
Sun announces delays in delivering Java technologies such as JDK 1.2 and HotSpot.
Sun acquires NetDynamics, a vendor of Java-based enterprise servers.
Hewlett Packard's efforts to get its alternative specifications accepted as the embedded Java standard fails. Sun sponsors
an industry-wide effort led by IBM to develop embedded Java specifications.
Sun gains a victory in its license-infringement lawsuit against Microsoft.
Sun announces a joint Java development and marketing alliance with AOL-Netscape.
Sun announces new community-source licensing model for Java 2 platform.
By year-end, the number of Java licensees has increased to over 200.

1999

Sun releases the Java 2 platform.
Sun introduces Jini, a Java-based networking technology for consumer appliances.
Sun releases portions of tbe Java source code.
Sun announces that major consumer electronics firms support use of Java as a digital television platform.
Sun announces a partnership with 14 vendors to create an open interface technology to connect home and small business
appliances.
Microsoft and Hewlett Packard join several other companies to form the J-Consortium, a group that aims to establish an
alternate standard for Java.
Sun switches from the ISO to the European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA) in its attempts to make Java an
official standard.
Transvirtual Technologies, a company funded by Microsoft, announces Java clone.
Alan Baratz, head of Java software development efforts, resigns; Sun appoints Pat Sueltz, formerly the head of IBM's Java
efforts, to take his place.
Sun abandons attempt to standardize Java through the ECMA in December.
Sun starts charging Java vendors a branding fee for products based on Java 2 platform.

2000

Sun offers source code for the Java 2 platform. Standard Edition, free of charge.
Sun announces the Joint Community Process 2.0, a more open process for the future development of Java.

Journal Interactive Edition, and Wired News, on a
real-time basis. We also downloaded all articles on
Java published between 1993 and 1998 in three
important trade journals—Computerworld, PC
Week, and Infoworld. We gained access to press
releases, white papers, and articles pertaining to
Java from Sun's Java Web site (java.sun.com).
These company documents offered us information
on various aspects of the Java technology, milestones in Sun's sponsorship efforts, and Sun's licensing policies with respect to Java.

We used these data to generate a chronology of
events; Table 1 is an abbreviated list of these
events.^ The multiple data sources helped us accomplish "triangulation" (Jick, 1979). There were
very few disagreements among the data sources on
the factual details pertaining to Java's emergence
and evolution. However, we noticed that Sun's actions often appeared to be contradictory over time.
• This case covers events until April 2000.
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reflecting tbe cballenges involved in tecbnology
sponsorsbip.
As we developed tbe cbronology and tbe case,
we were cognizant of tbe tbeoretical issues and
constructs tbat emerged from tbe data. In ongoing
discussions, we explored tentative constructs and
relationsbips among tbem to address pertinent
questions. We actively abandoned or modified tentative bypotbeses and retained tbose tbat bad
greater validity in view of tbe stream of data confronting us daily. We kept iterating between data
and tbeory till tbeoretical saturation was reacbed.
Indeed, recent additional events pertaining to
Sun's sponsorsbip efforts bave only served to confirm tbe validity of our framing and tbe focus of our
study.
We grappled witb tbe level of generality at wbicb
we wanted to articulate our findings, deciding to
articulate a tbeory tbat would be specifically applicable to network tecbnological fields, altbougb our
observations may be generalizable to otber tecbnological fields as well. Studying pbenomena in tbe
making requires teasing out tbe generative mecbanisms tbat underlie institutionalization processes
(Tsoukas, 1989). Tbis perspective, wben applied to
Sun's sponsorsbip of Java, offered two insigbts—
one at tbe level of standards and tbe otber at tbe
level of tbe sponsor. We found tbat standards in tbe
making generate seeds of self-destruction (cf.
Wade, 1996). At tbe sponsor level. Sun's actions
suggest tbat sucb attempts are fraugbt witb failure
and tbat a sponsor bas to deploy a combination of
social and political skills in a mix tbat depends
upon tbe exigencies of tbe situation. We develop
tbese insigbts in tbe rest of tbe article.
JAVA: A STANDARD IN THE MAKING
A Solution Looking for a Problem
In tbe early nineties, a small group of engineers at
Sun Microsystems created an ambitious software
program called Oak to enable various electronic
devices to run applications distributed to tbem
over a network. Initial attempts to commercialize
Oak—first for interactive TV, tben for video game
players, and finally for multimedia CD-ROM development— did not succeed. Subsequently, Oak's
original creators adapted tbe software program to
run on networks sucb as tbe Internet. In January
1995, Sun renamed Oak as Java and decided to
offer it as a new programming environment for tbe
Internet.
Sun saw in Java an opportunity to position itself
as a leader driving tbe Internet revolution. In creating a new tecbnological field around Java, Sun
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would be able to break away from tbe increasingly
marginalized Unix field as well as to counter tbe
increasing dominance of tbe Windows tecbnological field. If Java succeeded and Internet use grew.
Sun would be able to sbift tbe empbasis of tbe
entire information tecbnology field toward a network-centric approacb (its key strengtb) and
tbereby validate its long-beld belief tbat "tbe network is tbe computer." In otber words. Sun would
be able to leverage its ownersbip of Java to transform itself into a central player witbin tbe wider
post-PC, Internet-based information tecbnology
field. Tberefore, making Java an arcbitectural standard for tbe Internet was important for Sun.
However, Sun's uncontested window of opportunity was small. Microsoft bad announced its intention to release a comparable tecbnology called
Blackbird for its Windows platform in early 1996.
Given Microsoft's dominance, tbere was a possibility tbat Blackbird would become a dominant standard, tbereby furtber strengtbening tbe entrencbed
Windows tecbnological field. Additionally, consistent witb Scbumpeter's (1942) notion of potential
competition from future tecbnologies, tbere was a
tbreat tbat otber firms would eventually create
comparable tecbnologies. Tberefore, despite tbe absence of any otber comparable tecbnology in tbe
market at tbat time. Sun bad to move quickly to
gain support for its fledgling tecbnology.
Sun's Strategic Actions as a Sponsor
In network tecbnological fields, a powerful inducement for a firm to subscribe to an emerging
standard is access to valuable tecbnology tbat
migbt otberwise take considerable time and resources to develop. Tbis observation translates into
an "open systems" strategy for tbe tecbnology
sponsor, a strategy tbat Sun bad successfully pioneered earlier in tbe computer workstation market
(Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993). An open systems
strategy allows botb rivals and vendors of complementary products easy access to tbe sponsor's proprietary tecbnology.
For a sponsor, adopting an open systems strategy
implies placing part of its private knowledge in tbe
public domain. A property of sucb public goods is
tbat even tbose wbo bave not contributed to tbeir
creation can benefit ftom tbem (Olson, 1965). Typically, sucb a situation creates a ftee rider problem
resulting in tbe underdevelopment of tbe public
good or in tbe degradation of tbe "commons" (Hardin, 1982). However, in network tecbnological
fields tbat bave tbe potential to exbibit increasing
returns (Artbur, 1989), tbe conversion of some portion of private goods into public goods can attract
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others to join a collective (Raymond, 1999), Others
joining increases the carrying capacity of the
emerging technological field as the firms joining
the collective develop complementary assets, thereby
generating momentimi (Hughes, 1983), The excess
value that is created compensates firms for their willingness to cooperate.
Sun took advantage of such open systems dynamics to generate momentum behind its Java technology. First, Sun allowed third-party developers
to download Java for free from its Web site. Second,
it emphasized the "write-once, run-anywhere" capability of Java, contrasting this feature with the
typical need to rewrite software for each major
platform. Sun also made it easy for software developers to learn and use Java with initiatives such as
the creation of Java development tools, courses,
and partnerships (Sun Microsystems, 1999).
Often, an open systems strategy goes together
with a strategy of "priming" future expectations
(Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Garud, Jain, & Phelps,
1998). For firms subscribing to an emerging
standard, benefits do not exist in the present and
may be realized only if others too are persuaded to
subscribe to the standard. In such scenarios, the
technology sponsor attempts to generate such expectations by preannouncing access to future technologies even when product-markets have not yet
emerged. If a sponsor is successful in its agendasetting efforts (Lukes, 1974), interdependent firms
may be persuaded to join the bandwagon behind
the emerging standard. As the bandwagon grows,
so does the standard's legitimacy (Wade, 1995).
Eventually, this enhanced legitimacy results in the
deployment of technical and financial resources
that, in a self-fulfilling manner, generate the promised value from cooperation.
Sun began priming expectations by aggressively
marketing the Java brand and offering a vision of
what Java would eventually become—a complete
networking platform. Initially, however, this vision
Viras far beyond Java's limited functionality. As a
result of these agenda-setting efforts, potential partners and vendors began subscribing to Java and
awaited release of Java enhancements. As George
Paolini, director of corporate marketing at Sun's
Java Soft subsidiary, acknowledged. Sun's fight
was for the minds of individual developers and
potential partners:
In today's world, it's really about first creating
mindshare and awareness about a technology, and
then driving that technology to reality. That's really
what Java has been about, (Kirsner, 1997)
One can also view these initiatives as efforts by
Sun to establisb momentum behind the emerging
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Java technological field. These efforts became more
focused as Sun began promoting Java as an initiative mobilized against Microsoft's desktop-centric
view of computing. Indeed, Sun's GEO, Scott
McNealy, framed this mobilization of the "Java
force" against Microsoft as a metaphor evoking Star
Wars:
There are two camps, those in Redmond, who live
on the Death Star, and the rest of us, the rebel forces,
(Surowiecki, 1997)
Sun's slogan, "The network is the computer,"
and its promise to make Java a write-once, runeverywhere platform had an intuitive appeal for
programmers hoping to write software for the Internet, Clearly, the battle was for the minds of users
and vendors as much as it was for their computing
preferences.
Consistent with Fligstein's (1997) observations
on how an institutional entrepreneur mobilizes
support, this strategic framing helped Sun gain the
support of a broad set of partners, including systems assemblers, software firms, and component
manufacturers. By the end of 1995, nearly 40 key
vendors, including Adobe, AT&T, Borland, IBM,
Intel, Oracle, Symantec, and Toshiba, had licensed
Java from Sun. Also, major venture capital firms,
such as Kleiner Perkins Gaufield Byers, had
jumped on to the Java bandwagon by setting up
venture funds to finance new companies creating
Java-based applications (Schlender, 1997). As an
increasing number of developers and vendors
adopted Java, momentum grew rapidly. Not surprisingly, the vendors that had the most to gain
from displacing Microsoft's dominance were
among the first to join the Java field.
Eric Schmidt, then Sun's chief technology officer, suggested that Sun was trying to create an
architectural franchise around its Java technology
(Bank, 1995), However, Sun and members of the
emerging Java field realized that they would have
to compete with one another eventually and that
Sun would attempt to consolidate its own position
in the product-market even as it sponsored Java as
a common standard. As George Paolini observed:
Our model has always been to agree on a platform
and compete on its implementation. (Nerney, 1998)
A typical Java licensing agreement for commercial use sought an up-front fee and royalties on unit
sales of Java-based products. But it allowed licensees to modify the technology as long as they shared
these modifications freely with Sun and other licensees. Such a liberal policy would provide licensees with the flexibility to innovate, tbereby enabling tbe technology to evolve faster than Sun's
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solitary efforts could ensure. Also, it would allow
members of the Java field the flexibility to interpret
the technology to suit their own purposes (Pinch &
Bijker, 1987) and differentiate their product offerings from one another and from Sun's own offerings. Such flexibility during Java's early stages was
key to the mobilization of support from vendors
who otherwise would have had to develop comparable technologies on their own.

Countermobilization by Microsoft

An open systems strategy requires that the technology be equally accessible to all, both competitors and collaborators. An irony of the open process
is that powerful incumbent firms may withhold
support by not joining tbe bandwagon developing
around the emerging standard. After all, why
should they "credit" (Weick, 1979) an initiative
that could fundamentally challenge and compromise their dominance? This was the case with
Java, too.
Microsoft's early reaction was to actively ignore
Java and concentrate on promoting and developing
Blackbird, its alternative software. For Sun, Microsoft's refusal to endorse Java posed a legitimacy
challenge from the dominant Windows technological field. Later, as Java began gaining momentum,
Microsoft began discrediting Java. Microsoft claimed
that Java was not really revolutionary and that enhancements planned for its own proprietary Visual
Basic programming language would offer programmers as much functionality and flexibility as Java
(Wingñeld, 1995).
Tbis cat-and-mouse game between Sun and Microsoft came to a head when Microsoft finally capitulated and decided to license Java after Sun
paraded the results of its successful mobilization
efforts at a trade show in December 1995 (ElmerDewitt, 1996). At this stage, Microsoft's Web
browser was falling behind Netscape's because it
lacked the capacity to function with Java. In other
words, Microsoft could no longer afford not to endorse Java without being left behind.
There was some ambiguity as to whether Microsoft's announcement to license Java was an endorsement or a threat. Both were probably implied,
reflecting the coopetitional nature of standardization initiatives. As one industry analyst wrote:
Everybody expected Microsoft to strike back, reaffirming its commitment to its own Java-like Visual
Basic. But at tbe last minute. Gates changed his
mind, announcing that he too would license Java,
while also promising somewhat menacingly to "extend" it. (Elmer-Dewitt, 1996)

203

And extend Java, Microsoft did. Taking advantage of Sun's inability to deliver on its vision and
commitment to improve Java's functionality (Nerney, 1997), Microsoft began adding proprietary extensions to Java to improve how it worked with the
Windows operating system (Rein, 1997). Sun became concerned that Microsoft was trying to "poison" Java by creating its own, incompatible version. If Java fragmented into incompatible versions,
its write-once, run-anywhere capability would be
compromised, thereby reducing the incentive for
vendors and developers to subscribe to Java. Moreover, Sun would lose control of the software and
face credibility problems in creating a unified technological field around it. Sun bad earlier seen fragmentation within the Unix technological field and
wanted to prevent a similar occurrence with its
Java technology.^
Also at stake here was a battle for the very meaning of Java within the wider information technology field. Technological systems can be viewed as
being organized in a hierarchy, with some components being more central than others (Clark, 1985;
Hughes, 1983). Events in the Java technological
field suggest that this hierarchy itself is not a given
but is hotly contested. In licensing Java, Microsoft
attempted to subsume it within its existing portfolio of technologies. In this regard, whereas Sun
referred to Java as the applications platform for the
Internet, Microsoft sought to portray it merely as
one of many programming languages that it employed, thereby downplaying its significance.
In sum. Sun wanted Java to be at the apex of the
hierarchy, whereas Microsoft wanted its Windows
operating system to remain at the apex. The stakes
were high as the emerging hierarchy would critically impact the pecking order of firms not only
within the Java field but also within the wider
information technology field. Appreciating the
high stakes involved. Sun decided to challenge Microsoft's actions in the courts and wage a protracted
legal battle. In 1997, Sun filed a lawsuit charging
Microsoft with infringement of the Java licensing
agreement.

^ In the case of Unix, AT&T, restricted from entering
the computer industry by regulators, had licensed its
Unix operating system tecbnology liberally to all vendors. Over time, licensees bad introduced their own proprietary technologies into the licensed version, tbereby
creating several incompatible versions of Unix. Tbis fragmentation had prevented Unix from becoming dominant
in the computer industry. Competitive pressures and diverging interests have continued to plague attempts by
competing factions to unify Unix.
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Sun Attempts to Rein in Java
Besides waging a legal battle with Microsoft, Sun
simultaneously initiated other actions to prevent
fragmentation of its emerging Java standard. For
instance. Sun introduced an extensive suite of over
5,000 compatibility tests in December 1996. Soon
thereafter. Sun announced the 100% Pure Java initiative, under which Sun or its agent (KeyLabs Inc.)
would certify Java applications that passed its
stringent compatibility tests. In a statement released on December 3, Jon Kannegaard, vice president of SunSoft, Sun's software division, said:
Tbere is nothing more important to us than a ubiquitous, compatible Java platform. . . . We've devoted
enormous resources to developing robust and demanding tests to ensure that Java does indeed do
what we say it will do—in every implementation, on
every platform.
Although Sun's actions in enforcing Java compatibility primarily sought to curb Microsoft, they also
alerted other partners to Sun's seriousness about
protecting its Java franchise. As Alan Baratz, then
JavaSoft's president, proclaimed:
There is a package of Java functionality that we
deliver to the licensees. None of our licensees are
allowed to add, delete or modify things in that package. (Helft & Mardesich, 1997)
Several vendors, primarily Microsoft and its supporters (such as DEC, Intel, and Compaq), advised
Sun to hand over the administration of Java to an
international standards body (Dow Jones Newswires, 1997). Mr. McNealy, Sun's CEO, declined,
and he reiterated Sun's intention to use an "opencontrol" model of standardization wherein it
would keep the technology open but retain enough
control to drive the standard forward without waiting for consensus to develop (Jones, 1997). In explaining Sun's actions, Jim Mitchell, then vice
president of JavaSoft, stated:
Java is a brand name witb its own value and integrity tbat Sun must maintain. . . . We'll put Java in
tbe public domain wben Microsoft gives up Windows. (Gage, 1997)
Nevertheless, to formally legitimize its role as
Java's sole steward. Sun decided to seek the involvement of a neutral institutional body in its Java
sponsorship effort. Specifically, in March 1997,
Sun approached the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), the premier standards organization in the world, to gain recognition for Java as
a publicly available specification (PAS). Such an
initiative, if successful, would confer on Java the
status of an open international standard and simul-
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taneously protect Sun's control over Java's evolution.
Sun's open-control model for administering Java
illustrates the tension inherent in technology sponsorship. To enable Java's evolution into a technology that justified its original promise. Sun had to
allow members of the collective to adapt it for their
own use. At the same time. Sun had to exercise
control to ensure that the technology was not compromised by the creation of incompatible versions.
Such control was also necessary to mediate effectively between members of the collective when disputes arose over interpretation and implementation
of the technology.
Concerns Arise about Sun's Credibility
As Java began gaining in popularity, several
members of the Java collective became concerned
over what they perceived as Sun's excessive control over Java. Such concerns were heightened by
Sun's introduction of Java products that competed
with those offered by other members of the Java
collective. Even ardent supporters were afraid that
Sun's control would give it undue advantage when
competition intensified in the Java product-market.
Pat Sueltz, then general manager of Java software at
IBM, suggested:
Sun . . . sbould establish tbe standard and compete
above it. To tbe extent tbat Sun has any advantage,
it limits the creativity of their partners. [Moeller,
1997)
Many small vendors also felt that Sun was biased
in its stewardship of the emerging Java standard.
Depositions in the Sun-Microsoft court case revealed that Sun had secretly granted waivers to
favored partners (such as IBM, Novell, and Spyglass) that had failed its Java compatibility tests
(Helft & Quinlan, 1998) even as it used strong-arm
tactics against less-favored ones. In another case
alleging bias. Rick Ross, president of a small firm.
Activated Intelligence, complained that Sun had
broken a promise to include his firm's code in the
Java specification, in favor of code written by
Kodak, a larger and hence more valuable partner
(Oakes, 1998). These small vendors began perceiving Sun's control over Java as a case of a new tyrant
(Sun) trying to replace the old one (Microsoft).
These events illustrate the intensely political natm-e of the sponsorship process. They also offer key
insights into the complex roles played by a technology sponsor. Initiatives required to enable the
creation of a standard (opening up) are different
from those required to enforce compatibility (reining in). To the extent that the technology sponsor
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takes on the dual responsibility of creating as well
as enforcing the rules, there is potential for a loss of
credibility. As Bill Roth, product manager of Java at
Sun, pointed out in an interview:
We're doing our best to be faithful stewards, but
there are folks who would love to wrest control of
Java away from us. (Shankland, 2000a)
Compounding this problem is thepotential for
members of the collective to view the sponsor as
departing from its earlier publicized vision. Sun
had mobilized a coalition around Java by framing
issues in terms of the benefits that would accrue to
all potential partners. With time, as the technology
matured and competition intensified in the emerging product-market, Sun was perceived as reframing the issues and changing the rules of the game in
its own favor. Indeed, as a member of the Java
collective critical of Sun's role complained:
They want to be the referee, but they want to play in
the game too. (Nerney, 1998)
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To prevent Sun from deriving an unfair advantage in the embedded Java product-market, HP and
its supporters offered a proposal that competed
with NIST. Although Sun eventually defeated this
proposal by brandishing the unwelcome prospect
of fragmentation (Sliwa, 1999a), this event formalized the rift within the Java collective. HP and its
supporters decided to pursue further work on their
own version of embedded Java. Microsoft, still constrained by Sun's legal action, promptly licensed
HP's version of Java for its own use. Reflecting
upon these coevolutionary dynamics that resulted
in partners spinning off to work on their own initiatives, an industry analyst commented:
Indeed, Sun's relationship with Java licensees has
been fractious. Last year, several licensees, including HP, split off to form their own standard for
real-time Java. Even huge partners like IBM and
Novell chafed under Sun's control of the standards
process. (Darrow, 2000)

Sun Attempts to Regain Credibility
Rifts due to Coevotutionary Dynamics Emerge

Sun's actions as a rule enforcer began compromising its credibility to such an extent that even
close partners such as Netscape and Novell advised
Sun to make Java "open-source" software, albeit
with some safeguards to ensure its beneficial evolution (Gilmore, 1998). Prompted by concerns over
Sun's stifling control, Hewlett Packard (HP) announced plans in March 1998 to market its own
embedded Java clone in competition with Sun's
"favored" version. According to Jim Bell, the leader
of HP's Java development team:
Java is so important that we feel that it has outgrown
the ability of one company to control it. (Gomes,
1998a)
To deflect criticism of excessive control. Sun created an industry-wide group to develop an embedded Java standard under the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). However, HP
and several other vendors were suspicious that Sun
would co-opt this supposedly unbiased group into
adopting its own embedded Java specifications as
the standard. Indeed, Kelvin Nilsen, chief technology officer at NewMonics, a vendor involved in the
embedded Java standardization process, expressed
this suspicion:
I think Sun would like to take the open NIST process and bring it under their wing. . . . There's also a
sense Sun may leave the (NIST) group as we move
forward. (Wolfe, 1998)

Sun sought to address concerns that it was trying
to consolidate its own position in the emerging Java
product-market at the expense of other members of
the Java collective. It reorganized its Java business
to separate standardization efforts from product development (Clark, 1998). While announcing thirdparty auditing of its stewardship of the Java standard to ensure fairness. Sun also promised to share
its Java product introduction plans with members
of the Java collective.
In December 1998, Sun changed its licensing
model to provide more flexibility to its partners in
the Java collective. It began licensing the second
generation of Java technology under a community
source licensing model, under which Sun made
portions of the Java source code publicly available
(Gomes, 1998b). As in the other emerging opensource initiatives in the information technology
field, any licensee could adopt and modify Java
without sharing the modifications with Sun. Licensees could also share their modifications with
one another without getting prior permission from
Sun. Furthermore, even Java clone makers could
use the Java brand name for a fee as long as they
included certain Sun technologies in their products
[Computerworld, 1998). The only constraint that
Sun imposed on licensees and clone makers was
that their Java-based products had to pass Sundefined compatibility tests. Despite these concessions, however. Sun was not yet ready to relinquish
control. As Mr. Mitchell, vice president at Sun's
Java software division, cautioned:
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But, we are not going to go overboard [in opening
the Java standards process] because tbe day we do
that, the big guys will come out, and they can spend
lots of money, and [there] will be fragmentation
(Sliwa, 1998).

Formal Legitimacy Eludes Sun
Notwitbstanding its attempts to regain credibility. Sun was dealt a setback in its bid to get Java
certified by tbe ISO as a PAS. After protracted
negotiations spanning two years, ISO members
voted to require sponsors of a PAS to cede maintenance of tbe standard to tbe international body.
Sun immediately backed away from its initiative to
make Java a PAS under ISO's auspices.
Instead, in May 1999, it approacbed tbe European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA),
anotber important standards organization, to seek
tbeir endorsement for Java (Bingley, 1999). At tbe
EGMA too. Sun faced opposition to its insistence on
retaining control over Java. After many fractious
meetings witb members of tbe EGMA, Sun decided to
discontinue its efforts to seek EGMA endorsement
(Sliwa, 1999b). Tbe association's executives and
members found Sun's actions so egregious tbat Jan
van den Beld, tbe secretary general of EGMA, complained in a public letter;
Their action over tbe past two years has resulted in
an enormous waste of experts' time and companies'
money. (Shankland, 2000b)

In sum. Sun's aborted attempts at gaining legitimacy instead led to depletion of legitimacy. A
sponsor's legitimacy is destroyed to tbe extent tbat
it attempts to co-opt a neutral institutional body
and tben backs away from tbe initiative wben tbe
institutional body requires neutrality from tbe
sponsor. Legitimacy losses sucb as tbese can be
even more damaging wben membersbip of different
organizations overlaps. Tbis was tbe case witb tbe
ISO, tbe EGMA, and tbe Java collective.
The Future of Java

Even as legitimacy problems continued to plague
Sun, its activities in tbe Java product-market intensified. For instance, in 1998, Sun acquired NetDynamics, a vendor of Java-based "enterprise servers," and forged a broad product development
alliance witb AOL-Netscape. Sucb a transformation
from a relatively benevolent tecbnology sponsor to
an active competitor migbt bave been unavoidable
as Sun decided to casb in on Java, its most valuable
asset. Tbis barvesting strategy, bowever, could
bave created a counterproductive perception tbat

Sun's own programmers enjoyed an unfair advantage over otber members of tbe collective in creating Java applications (mucb as Microsoft's application programmers bave been accused of baving
unfair access to Windows).
As Java matured, otber members of tbe coalition
sougbt to safeguard tbeir own private interests by
demanding more control over Java's future. Responding to tbeir pressure, in Marcb 2000, Sun
offered to relinquisb more of its control over Java
(Sbankland, 2000b). Sun proposed a new process,
called Java Gommunity Process (JGP) 2.0, for tbe
Stewardsbip of tbe Java standard. JGP 2.0 allows
members of tbe Java coalition to establisb working
groups to extend tbe Java standard into new areas
and determine wben tbese new specifications will
be released to tbe public. As a spokesperson from
Sun stated:
Java was our little baby. [It was] very bard to let go
of its band when it was taking its first steps. . . . It's
almost at the adolescent stage. Maybe we sbould
start letting it walk a bit more on its own. (Sbankland, 2000b)

Despite tbese public announcements and initiatives, new complaints emerged tbat Sun was unfairly cbarging partners licensing fees even wben
tbey bad contributed significantly to tbe extension
of tbe Java standard under tbe new communitysource licensing initiative (Lyons, 2000). Reflecting
on tbe tension tbat private interests inevitably generate in initiatives involving collectives, Daniel
Lyons, an industry analyst, observed:
The squabble threatens to rupture the already fractious alliance. IBM and others could start touting a
version of Java different from the one Sun pushes.
(Lyons, 2000)
It remains to be seen wbetber Sun manages to
walk tbe fine line between opening up and controlling its Java tecbnology, tbereby preventing fragmentation. Wbatever tbe future brings. Sun's sponsorsbip of tbe Java standard provides key insigbts
into tbe nature of tbe standardization process, tbe
tensions confronted by a tecbnology sponsor as a
standard emerges aiid evolves, and tbe interactions
among strategic actors tbat togetber determine tbe
standard's eventual rise or downfall.
DISCUSSION

We began tbis article by bigbligbting tbe important role tbat institutions play in tbe functioning of
tecbnological fields. We narrowed our focus to examine tbe emergence of common standards governing tbe functioning of network tecbnological fields.
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In focusing on standards, we began addressing
questions of central interest to institutional theorists: How do these standards emerge? What are the
challenges associated with sponsoring them? Our
objective was to generate insights on the processes
associated with institutional entrepreneurship in
shaping standards in the making.
Our introductory discussion revealed two paradoxical properties associated with standards. First,
standards both enable and constrain. This structurational property of standards makes it difficult for
actors to forge agreements that enable activities in
the present but have the potential to constrain activities in the future. Second, the creation of standards involves cooperation between competitors.
This coopetitional property of standards makes it
difficult for actors with private interests to reach
consensus on common standards.
Sponsorship Challenges
These structurational and coopetitional properties interact with each other to create a situation
wherein a standard is as much a set of rules that
firms agree upon as a set of rules that they plan to
depart from. Under these conditions, orchestrating
the emergence of a standard is a complex task.
These difficulties become all the more pronounced
when a firm with its own interests, such as Sun,
attempts to sponsor its technology as the common
standard. There is little doubt that the technology
sponsor is attempting to shape emerging institutions for its own competitive gain. It is no wonder
that incumbents and newcomers are wary of the
sponsor's intentions. Indeed, they carefully assess
the sponsor's every move before deciding whether
to join or counter these sponsorship efforts.
Mobilization challenges. At the outset, a new
standards initiative will have to counter the inertia
associated with entrenched standards that enable
the functioning of existing technological fields. Additionally, it will encounter resistance from dominant actors in existing technological fields who are
threatened by the new standard. As Sun's actions
suggest, one way to overcome this initial inertia
and resistance is to mobilize a large collective
around the new standard. But mobilizing support is
not easy. The sponsor has to persuade potential
rivals to constrain themselves to a standard that
could place them at a competitive disadvantage in
the future.
In such instances, a sponsor may attempt to
jump-start a collective by placing a portion of its
technology in the public domain. This initiative is
consistent with an open-systems approach to sponsorship. By opening up its technology, the sponsor
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may gain the support of firms that wish to gain
access to a promising technology without having to
invest afresh in a competing alternative. However,
this initiative alone may still not be enough to
entice a critical mass of firms to join the collective.
The sponsor may also have to galvanize action by
evoking images of a collective organized against a
powerful and unpopular incumbent. Such an action is consistent with observations in the institutional theory literature on how actors generate momentum by evoking the image of a common enemy
(Swaminathan & Wade, 2001). If the sponsor's vision of a redefined technology field free of oppression is alluring enough, even potential rivals may
overcome their natural wariness and enlist in the
war against the common enemy.
More broadly, these actions illustrate the social
skills a sponsor needs to mobilize a collective
around its technology. Social skills represent an
actor's ability to motivate cooperation in other actors by providing them with common meanings
and identities around which actions can be undertaken and justified (Fligstein, 1997; Rao, 1998). By
offering its partners a compelling vision of a future
technological trajectory, an actor can attract the
support of a large number of actors to its emerging
collective.
Maintenance challenges. The mobilization of a
collective is but the first of several challenges that a
sponsor confronts. As the Java case illustrates,
members of an emerging collective may begin departing from the emerging standard even as they
agree to conform to it. One of the reasons for doing
so is political. For instance, an actor can join an
emerging collective and attempt to create countermobilization movements from within. Firms may
also depart from the standard for strategic reasons.
After all, members of a collective may implement
the standard in line with their own interpretations
of the standard and their needs to differentiate their
products in the marketplace.
It makes little difference to the sponsor whether
firms are departing for political or strategic reasons.
Of greater significance is that such actions can potentially fragment the emerging standard, as members of the collective begin offering multiple versions of the standard. This has been the fate of
several other standardization initiatives, most notably Unix.
It is essential to have a uniform implementation
of a standard if it is to function effectively. The
problem is that, like the sponsor, other firms would
also like to have their specifications incorporated
into the emerging standard. In this context, if the
sponsor is not careful, it may easily lose control
over its standard as well as its position in the hier-
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archy of the emerging technological field. This was
the situation that transpired with IBM in the case of
personal computers.
Either eventuality—the fragmentation of a standard or the ceding of its control to rivals—is unacceptable to a sponsor. The sponsor can deal with
these challenges by establishing specific control
mechanisms over the standardization process. For
instance, as in the Java case, the sponsor may use
legal mechanisms to thwart countermobilization
and enforce rigorous testing of different implementations to ensure compatibility.
Clearly, with these initiatives, the sponsor displays a different set of skills from the ones it had
used earlier to mobilize the bandwagon. Specifically, the ability and willingness of a sponsor to
protect its franchise with legal instruments and
enforcement mechanisms represent political skills.
Political skills may include strong-arm tactics used
to sustain cooperation within a coalition and to
keep members with private interests from diverging
from the common meanings and identities that the
sponsor had established earlier.
Contradictory pressures. When the challenges
of mobilizing a coalition are compounded by those
of maintaining it, the dilemma of a technology
sponsor becomes even starker. Civen the sponsor's
need to continue with mobilization efforts, the appropriate level of control becomes an important
issue for consideration. Too little control may lead
to fragmentation or loss of ownership, whereas too
much control may stifle the very emergence of the
standard.
This dilemma arises because standards evolve
even as they are being used to develop compatible
products and applications (Garud & Kumaraswamy,
1995b; Jain, 2001). Tbis process reflects the duality
implicit in standards in the making, wherein a standard is botb tbe medium and tbe outcome of action
(Ciddens, 1984). Under these conditions, orchestrating both the mobilization and the maintenance
of the collective is an incredibly complex task for
the sponsor.
This task is rendered all the more difficult by the
presence of members with private interests within
the collective. The process becomes highly politicized as a result. In such a situation, "legitimacy
traps" emerge for the sponsor, as it too has private
interests at stake. Specifically, as the Java case illustrates, initiatives taken by the sponsor to enforce
a relatively uniform meaning structure may easily
be perceived by others as attempts to gain control
for private gain. Consequently, members of the collective may begin perceiving that the sponsor is not
really earnest in its intentions to keep the standard
open. It is not surprising, therefore, that Sun's ac-
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tions to orchestrate compliance with its Java specifications generated doubts about its future intentions.
These observations add to our understanding of
how processes associated with standards sponsorship create legitimacy challenges for the sponsor.
The structurational and coopetitional properties of
standards interact to create legitimacy traps for
technology sponsors. Legitimacy traps are especially likely to arise to the extent that rule creation
and rule enforcement reside with the sponsor. As
rule creator, the sponsor determines which rules
are integrated into the standard and when they will
be promulgated. As rule enforcer, the sponsor ensures that members of the collective conform to the
set of rules it has established for the technology. In
taking on both roles, the sponsor requires collective
members to conform to current or old rules even as
it orchestrates the creation of new rules. In other
words, members of the collective often find themselves to be one step behind the sponsor. This may
result in a loss of credibility for the sponsor.

Comparison with other Sponsorship Initiatives
It is instructive to compare Sun's sponsorship
experience with initiatives in other technological
fields. Over the years, there have been many sponsorship initiatives involving an open-systems approach. Examples include IBM's accidental sponsorship of the personal computer field, Apple's
efforts to encourage cloning of its Macintosh architectiure and, more recently, AOL-Netscape's Mozilla
open-source initiative to create a new version of its
Navigator Web browser. Firms in technological
fields such as consumer electronics have also sponsored their technologies employing an opensystems approach. Popular examples include JVC's
sponsorship of its VHS technology in the vidéocassette recorder field (Hariharan, 1990) and Columbia's sponsorship of its 33 1/3 rpm music-recording
technology (Langlois & Robertson, 1992).
However, sponsorship using an open-systems approach does not guarantee success. For instance,
AOL-Netscape's Mozilla open-source initiative was
plagued by delays that have contributed to Navigator's decline in market share. Moreover, a number
of firms have encountered legitimacy traps as part
of their respective sponsorship initiatives. IBM's
ill-fated attempts at establishing control over the
open architecture in the personal computer field by
introducing the PS/2 personal computer system
with its proprietary microchannel "bus" architecture is one example. Apple too encountered legitimacy problems when it abruptly changed its open-
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systems strategy midstream by voiding its licensing
agreements with clone manufacturers.
Despite these examples of limited success, such
sponsorship efforts are increasing in number. Many
efforts become intertwined with legitimacy issues
as firms claim to be more open than others. This is
likely to happen because the structurational property of standards interacts with its coopetitional
property. As in the Sun case, initiatives by the
sponsor to coordinate a collective around standards
are perceived as attempts to establish control for
private gain. Specifically, when private interests
exist, control mechanisms deployed by the sponsor
to coordinate a collective are likely to politicize the
open-systems sponsorship model.
In sum, the private interests implicit in coopetition can complicate the already muddy waters created by the structurational property of standards.
To appreciate this point, it is useful to compare the
Java case with a sponsorship initiative that is currently generating considerable interest—the Linux
operating system. A key difference between the two
cases is that private interests have so far been
muted in the Linux case. As Linux is available free,
firms have sought to generate rents by offering support and other services related to the operating
system. Therefore, cooperation to create and maintain the standard has not yet been plagued by competition to appropriate benefits. Tensions between
rule creation and rule enforcement have largely
been kept at bay through a grassroots culture that
stresses openness, sharing, and compatibility more
than commercial gain (Stallman, 1999). Moreover,
challenges associated with the structurational
property of standards have been muted because the
number of rules associated with the standard have
been kept to a minimum, thereby allowing the
Linux collective considerable flexibility. Till recently, these facets have led to the rapid growth of
the collective around Linux.
Private interests, however, are coming into play
in the Linux case as well. Vendors such as Corel
and TurboLinux have begun including their own
proprietary technologies in the core Linux operating system (Hamm, 1999; Orenstein, 1999). Large
established vendors such as IBM have begun endorsing Linux as the "operating system of the Internet" (Lohr, 2000). As private interests generate
coopetition, some of the same legitimacy traps that
have dogged Sun in the Java case may become
apparent in the Linux case too.
Nevertheless, it is possible that private interests
are emerging at a stage when Linux has gained
sufficient momentum to carry it through the institutionalization process. The timing of the appearance of private interests during a standard's emer-
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gence might be a key issue. Private interests, if they
appear too early, may dampen a collective's ability
to generate sufficient momentum around a standard. This could well be the case with Java.
Summary Insights
We offer summary insights on how the Java case
adds to understanding of institutional entrepreneurship through technology sponsorship initiatives within network technological fields. Our first
observation pertains to the ftagility of the standardization process. The structurational and coopetitional properties of standards interact to create an
institutionalization process that is inherently unstable and politicized. Members of a collective may
depart from agreements on common standards for
political, strategic, or interpretive reasons. This situation is especially true when a sponsor is unable
or unwilling to deliver upon promises in a timely
manner, a situation that transpired in Sun's case.
At the margin, it may be difficult to ascertain
whether a member of the collective is extending or
fragmenting the emerging standard.
Even as firms begin diverging from a common
standard, they want their own innovations to be
built into it. A fresh round of negotiations ensues as
firms bargain with one another to determine the
composition of the evolving standard. Moreover, as
the number of firms that constitute the standards
collective increases, the challenges associated with
coordinating the collective also increase. At this
point, firms may decide to leave the collective and
offer their own versions of the standard. With time,
these coevolutionary dynamics, if left unattended,
can ñ-agment the emerging standard. In sum, institutionalization processes involving standards' creation and maintenance are inherently fragile.
Under these conditions, it is difficult even for a
neutral body to sponsor a common standard. These
challenges are all the more pronounced when a
firm seeks to sponsor a common standard. Specifically, a sponsor's private interests begin generating
credibility problems when it begins enforcing rules
that it helped to create. Often, sponsors do not
address these problems ex ante as they become
clear only once the constraining facets of standards
become evident to collective members. When the
constraints become clearer, members may attempt
to depart from the collective.
To orchestrate the sponsorship effort, the sponsor needs to deploy both social and political skills.
Whereas social skills represent an actor's ability to
motivate cooperation in other actors by providing
them with common meanings and identities, political skills represent its ability to sustain coopera-
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tion when private interests force divergence from
these common meanings and identities. A sponsor
has to exercise both these skills simultaneously as
it tries to mobilize a collective, even as it attempts
to coordinate its activities. The challenge in exercising both skills become apparent when one understands that these skills themselves contrast with
one another. In this context, strategic action is an
attempt by the sponsor to create and sustain a semblance of stability given the fragility of the standardization process.
These insights, one at the level of standards and
the other at the level of the technology sponsor,
were well captured by Sun's vice president, Jon
Kannegaard, who likened his company's stewardship of Java to a car "that has two wheels on the
ground and two wheels off and is always about to
tip over" (Gage, 1999).
CONCLUSION

This study offers us several insights on institutional entrepreneurship in emerging technological
fields. Our observations suggest that common technological standards, which are a key facet of the
institutional environment of network technological
fields, have built-in tensions. All standards have
enabling and constraining effects, and they are often forged through cooperation among competitors.
This process generates temporary, peirtial agreements by interdependent parties with priyate and
sometimes diverging interests. The challenge of engendering collective action is further complicated
by intertemporal inconsistencies between the initiatives required to mobilize a collective and those
required to maintain it. These tensions make it
difficult for a firm to sponsor its proprietary technology as a common standard.
These observations suggest the need to closely
examine standards in the making in order to understand the institutionalization of technological
fields. The Java case illustrates how the standardization process can be co-opted by means of impression management, sense making, attempts to
change the rules of the game by appeal to authority,
competing sources of legitimacy, and loose coupling between institutions and their sponsors. The
creation of institutions, even technical ones, is
messy, manipulative, instrumental, conscious, and
devious. Essentially, even the development of technological standards is a battle fought in political
and cognitive realms.*

* We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this
input.

An appreciation of these processes offers us an
opportunity to reflect on the nature and scope of
the agency involved in sponsoring common standards. A sponsor walks a fine line in creating a
common standard that enables rather than constrains the emergence of a technological field. At
any stage of the sponsorship effort, a sponsor has to
maintain a common standard even as it is being
created. Maintenance and creation require political
and social skills, respectively. As one might expect,
these skills themselves contradict each other. Institutional entrepreneurship, then, may require an
ability to deploy these skills in such a manner that
they do not exacerbate the contradictions that are
inherent in standards' creation and maintenance
but, instead, provide a synthesis.
Our theoretical frame can be gainfully employed
to study the interactions between the micro actions
of actors and emerging macro institutional structures (Fligstein, 1999; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997;
Schelling, 1978) in other settings. There are many
cases in the contemporary realm that qualify as
relevant strategic research sites. These include mobile telephony, broadband communications, digital
music distribution, and data communications. One
line of inquiry could focus on the timing and extent
to which institutional entrepreneurs open up or
control their technologies. Another line of inquiry
could explore the kinds of governance mechanisms
that institutional entrepreneurs put in place to coordinate and regulate the activities of a collective.
Such inquiry w^ould help in developing a body of
knowledge about institutional entrepreneurship in
emerging technological fields.
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